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The Function of Corporate Tax-Residence in
Territorial Systems
Omri Marian*
INTRODUCTION
Under the U.S. “worldwide” (or “residence-based”) tax
system, corporations that are considered “domestic” for tax
purposes are generally taxed on their worldwide income from
whatever source derived.1 Foreign corporations are taxed in the
United States only to the extent they earn income that is sourced
within the United States. The U.S. residence-based system is
frequently contrasted with “territorial” (or “source-based”)
systems, variants of which are adopted by most member
countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).2 In a territorial system, income is only
taxed if it is derived from sources within the geographical
boundaries of a jurisdiction. This is generally true whether the
income is earned by foreign or domestic taxpayers.
Foreign-source income (meaning, income sourced outside the
jurisdiction’s geographical boundaries) is generally exempt from
tax.
In a previous article, I outlined a functional approach to
corporate tax-residence determination in residence-based
systems.3 This Essay complements that article by explaining the

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am
thankful to Reuven Avi-Yonah, Susie Morse, and participants at the Chapman Law
Review Symposium on “Business Tax Reform: Emerging Issues in the Taxation of U.S.
Entities” for their helpful comments.
1 This rule is of course subject to multiple exceptions that enable U.S. domestic
corporations to avoid current taxation on most foreign-sourced income. See, e.g., Edward
D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 700 (2011) (describing the United
Sates residence-based system as an “ersatz variant on territorial systems”); J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J.
79 (2009) (surveying the U.S. exception to residence-based taxation, concluding it does not
function as a residence-based system). The starting point of the analysis, however, is that
U.S. corporations’ worldwide income is subject to corporate tax in the United States.
2 See Omri Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in
the United States, 32 VA. TAX REV. 133, 163–65 (2012) [hereinafter Marian, Meaningless
Comparisons].
3 Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2013)
[hereinafter Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations].
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functional importance of corporate tax-residence determination
in territorial systems. I differentiate between “positive” and
“negative” functionalities of corporate tax-residence in territorial
systems. Under a positive approach, corporate tax-residence
positively points to the source of income earned by the
corporation. Thus, corporate taxes serve as a proxy to source
taxation. While the positive function had historical merit, it is
currently obsolete.4
Under a negative approach, corporate tax-residence is only
relevant to the extent it prevents income from being sourced to a
jurisdiction in which income could not have possibly been
generated. As such, residence determination serves as an
instrument to prevent income shifting and base erosion. I suggest
that this is the correct role of residence determination in the
current environment.5
More specifically, multinational corporations use multiple
“income shifting” techniques to erode the tax base in jurisdictions
in which income has economically been generated. Such
techniques are aimed at manipulating the source of income for
tax purposes by having income that has been generated in a
high-tax jurisdiction reported as earned in a low-tax jurisdiction.
Income shifting techniques necessitate the use of affiliate
corporations resident in different jurisdictions. At least one of
these corporations must be a tax resident in a low-tax
jurisdiction, so income can be booked (i.e., shifted) to that foreign
affiliate. Such foreign affiliates usually perform little or no real
economic activity. Therefore, I suggest that residence
determination in territorial systems should be constructed so as
to make sure that such foreign affiliates are not respected as tax
residents of jurisdictions where no real activity takes place.
The issue of residence determination in territorial systems is
a timely one in the United States. In recent years, the idea to
replace the U.S. residence-based system with a territorial one
gained substantial traction. One recent example is a
comprehensive tax reform draft suggested by David Camp, the
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means. Camp’s
proposal adopts the territorial variant known as a “participation
exemption” system.6 Under a participation exemption system,
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See discussion infra Part III.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS , 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014
DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY tit. IV, available at http://waysand
means.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_section_by_section_summary_final_022
614.pdf.
4
5
6
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dividends paid by foreign subsidies of U.S. corporations, as well
as capital gains from the disposition of foreign subsidiaries, and
other foreign operations will be largely exempt from U.S. tax. A
similar recent proposal has been brought forward by Michael
Enzi, a member of the Senate Finance Committee.7
One common theme of these recent territorial-reform
proposals is their complete ignorance of the issue of corporate
tax-residence. While the reason for such ignorance is not explicit,
it is possibly based on the assumption that in territorial
systems—in which the question of jurisdiction is a question of
source rather than residence—residence determination is
meaningless.8 This is wrong. The reason is that in many
instances the source of income is keyed off the residence of a
corporation. Income from dividends and interest payments is
sourced to the residence of the paying corporation.9 Capital gains
from the sale of a corporate subsidiary’s stock are sourced to the
residence of the corporate seller.10 There are other examples
where source of income is directly linked to the residence of the
taxpayer.11 These source rules play an important role in
intercompany payments that stand in the basis of income
shifting techniques. Questions of source and residence are not
really separate jurisdictional questions. Residence is used to
manipulate source, and as such can be designed to prevent such
manipulation.
Currently, the United States uses a formal test for corporate
residence determination—the place of incorporation (POI). This
test is notoriously easy to manipulate. All that one has to do in
order to create a “foreign” affiliate in a tax haven is to
incorporate one. Leaving this test intact under a territorial
system may exacerbate the problem of income shifting.

7 United States Job Creation and International Tax Reform Act of 2012, S. 2091,
112th Cong. tit. I (2012).
8 See Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, supra note 3, at 1630.
9 See Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L.
REV. 259, 281 (2003) (“The basic rule sources the interest income to the country of the
payor . . . . Most countries consider the residence of the payor as the country of source.”
And “[a] powerful consensus also exists with respect to the source rules for dividends.
They are sourced at the country of the dividends’ payor, which allows the source country
to get the ‘first bite’ of taxation.”).
10 HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 539 (3d ed. 2010) (“[M]ost countries generally accept the
international treaty norm that capital gains on shares are taxable only in the residence
country of the shareholder.”).
11 For some additional examples in the U.S. context, see I.R.C. §§ 861–863 (2012)
(source depends on residence in the context of guarantee fees, communications income,
certain sales through fixed place of business, and more).
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This Essay continues as follows: In Part I, I explain the
functional approach to corporate tax-residence determination. In
short, the functional approach requires that tax-residence models
will be constructed so as to support the policy purpose for which
corporations are taxed in the first place. In territorial systems,
any corporate-tax construct (including residence) can only make
sense if it operates to assure that income produced in a specific
jurisdiction is taxed in that jurisdiction. In Part II, I explore the
possible functionalities of residence determination in supporting
territorial taxation, using the United States as a case study.
Historically, tax-residence positively functioned as a proxy to the
source of income. Today, however, such function can no longer
stand. In Part III, I discuss an alternative instrumentality of
residence determination in territorial systems. Residence can
have a negative functionality, namely it can point to jurisdictions
that are clearly not the source of income. As such, residence
determination functions as an anti-income-shifting mechanism.
One way to achieve such a function is to adopt tax-residence
determination that is based on formulary apportionment that
takes into account a corporation’s contribution to the control
group earnings (though there are other tests that may achieve
similar results). I conclude with a call to consider
corporate-residence determination in U.S. territorial reform
proposals.
I. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO CORPORATE TAX-RESIDENCE
A. The Functional Approach in Residence-Based Systems
Corporate tax-residence, namely, the determination whether
a corporation is “domestic” or “foreign” for tax purposes, is a
foundational legal construct. The tax-residence heavily affects
the tax liability of the corporation and its affiliates.
Unfortunately, corporate tax-residence is meaningless as a
normative construct. The reason is that corporations are not real
beings; they are imaginary entities. Corporations are not, in and
of themselves, the target of policy making.12 Rather, corporations
are instruments. Corporations are used by their individual
interest holders (such as shareholders, creditors, managers, and
employees) to achieve certain goals. In turn, corporations are

12 Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax Electivity of
U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 395 (2011) (“After all, corporations are not
sentient beings, and cannot feel benefits or burdens. Thus, they are not directly of
normative interest.”).
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targeted by policy makers to affect individuals who are involved
with corporations.
Taxation of corporate entities is not different. Corporate
taxes are one of the most common forms of taxation around the
world. But it is not the corporations that are burdened by such
tax. Individuals are.13 For example, shareholders may see a
diminished net return on their investment as a result of the tax
imposed at the corporate level. Alternatively, employees may
bear the burden through decreased wages. Or, it may be the case
that consumers are affected if corporate taxes are capitalized into
the pricing of the corporate products and services.14
Given that corporations are nothing more than an
instrumentality, I have suggested in a previous article that
corporate tax-residence determination must also be instrumental
to the policy of corporate taxation.15 Namely, in formulating a
model for corporate tax-residence determination, we must work
through two steps. First, define the policy purposes for which we
tax corporations. Specifically, we must identify the group (or
groups) of individuals whom we wish to burden by taxing
corporations. The second step is to adopt the tax-residence test
that best supports the policy purpose we identified. A corporate
tax-residence test (as well as any corporate-tax construct, in fact)
is only successful if it assures that corporate taxes eventually
burden the intended individuals.
In residence-based systems, such as the United States, the
underlying assumption is that there is a group or groups of
individuals, the income of whom we wish to tax on a worldwide
basis. Corporate tax is just an instrument to reach at the pockets
of these individuals. Depending on who these individuals are, we
may adopt different tax-residence tests.16 For example, if those
individuals are shareholders, we may choose to determine the
residence of corporations based on where the majority of
shareholders reside. If we aim to burden the managers of
corporations (in their capacity as managers), we might choose to
13 The question of who those individuals are is unresolved and subject to a lively
academic debate. See Marian, Meaningless Comparisons, supra note 2, at 161–62.
14 See WILLIAM M. GENTRY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
OTA PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE
INCOME TAX 1 (2007) (“[C]orporate tax could be borne by some combination of the
shareholders of corporations, investors in all capital through a decrease in the overall
return to capital, workers through a decrease in wages, and customers through increased
output prices.”).
15 Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, supra note 3.
16 For a discussion of possible groups of individuals who may be the normative
targets of corporate tax policy, see id. at 1638–49.
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subject corporations to tax in the jurisdiction in which the
corporate headquarters is located.
B. The Functional Approach in Territorial Systems
The assumption that corporate taxation is an instrument to
tax the worldwide income of certain individuals cannot stand in
territorial systems of taxation. The reason is that in territorial
systems, a policy choice has already been made to only tax
income sourced within the jurisdiction, regardless of the
residency of the taxpayers earning such income. In our quest to
determine the “correct” corporate-residence in territorial
systems, we therefore must start with a positive assumption that
territorial taxation is superior, as a policy matter, to worldwide
taxation.17
Under a functional approach to territorial taxation, we could
justify the taxation of corporate entities only to the extent it
supports source-based taxation. Namely, that taxing a corporate
entity somehow assures that income is subject to tax in the
jurisdiction in which it has been created. This should be true
regardless of the identity of the individuals involved with the
corporation. This concludes the first step of the functional
analysis of corporate tax-residence determination in territorial
systems. In the next two parts, I address the second part of the
analysis. Meaning, how different models of corporate
tax-residence may functionally support source-based taxation.
II. THE “POSITIVE FUNCTION” OF CORPORATE TAX-RESIDENCE
A. Corporate-Residence as a Proxy for Source
The first obvious possible territorial instrumentality of
corporate tax-residence is that residence of a corporation
positively identifies the source of income. Under this approach,
income earned by a corporation that is a tax-resident in
jurisdiction X is assumed to be sourced in jurisdiction X.
Similarly, payments made by a corporation resident in
jurisdiction X (for example, dividend or interest payments) are
assumed to be sourced in jurisdiction X. I refer to this function as
the “positive function” of corporate tax-residence.
17 This is probably one of the most contested issues in international tax literature,
and beyond the scope of this Essay; I assume that for whatever reason, policy makers
have reached a conclusion that a territorial system of taxation is preferable. For a
summary of arguments in the debate on territorial versus worldwide systems (as well as
other tax methods), see JANE G. G RAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34115, REFORM OF
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ALTERNATIVES 1 (2012).
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The positive approach is very much apparent in the current
system of international taxation. For example, practically all
countries in the world source interest and dividend payments to
the country of residence of the paying corporation.18 The
philosophical underpinning for this rule is that the payments
should be sourced to the place where the economic activity
supporting the payment is taking place.19 Since it is the economic
activity of the corporation that supports that payment, income
should be sourced to the residence of the corporation. For this
justification to make sense, however, we must add one additional
logical link: we must assume that the economic activity of a
corporation indeed takes place where the corporation resides for
tax purposes.
Historically, this assumption seems to have had some
traction. In 1923, the League of Nations commissioned a group of
economists to study the taxation of cross-border transactions.20
The resulting report proved to be an influential tax policy
document.21 The report explicitly linked residence of business
entities and the source of income earned by such entities. For
example, the report referred to the “seat and residence” of a
business as one of the four elements of “economic allegiance,”
which in turn is one of the possible bases upon which the
imposition of tax may be justified.22 The report acknowledged,
however, the complexity associated with such an assumption.
When discussing the source of dividends, for example, the report
considered the “fact that the company may produce its goods in
one State and sell them in another, or have its chief office in one
State and yet secure most of its earnings from sales in other
States.”23 This may result in “multiplicity of the claims of origin”
of the dividends.
Today, the positive view is sometimes used to explain the
allocation of taxing jurisdictions on international income in the
context of bilateral income tax treaties. Such treaties are
18 See generally Brauner, supra note 9; AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Richard Vann, International Aspects of Income Tax, in TAX LAW DESIGN
AND DRAFTING II 718, 722 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996).
20 Fin. Comm. Econ. & Fin. Comm’n, Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations
Doc. E.F.S. 73 F. 19 (1923), available at http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/pubotbin/tocc
er-new?id=brulegi.sgml&images=acdp/gifs&data=/usr/ot&tag=law&part=1&division=div1
[hereinafter Report on Double Taxation].
21 It is argued that a coherent international tax regime exists and that its principals
have been developed by the 1923 document. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of
International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996).
22 See Report on Double Taxation, supra note 20.
23 Id.
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instruments that determine how income from cross-border
transactions is allocated between the two signatory countries.
Most treaties are based on a model published by the OECD.
Professor Richard Vann concludes that under the OECD model,
corporate tax functions as a “source tax” for business activities.24
As Vann explains, tax treaties regularly provide that business
income earned in a contracting state through a “permanent
establishment” of a foreign taxpayer is taxed at source (i.e., the
jurisdiction
where the
foreign
taxpayer’s
permanent
establishment is located).25 Permanent establishment is usually a
fixed place of business, which is not legally separate (for
example, by way of incorporation) from the controlling foreign
taxpayer.26 Business income earned not through a permanent
establishment is generally exempt from source taxation.
However, foreign taxpayers may operate in the country of
source not through permanent establishments, but rather
through controlled subsidiaries that are respected as separate
from their owners. Generally, holding the stock of a corporation
does not give rise to a permanent establishment of a shareholder
in the subsidiary’s jurisdiction. However, under the tax treaty
network, such domestic subsidiaries are generally subject to tax
jurisdiction in their country of residence. Thus, the taxation of
domestic subsidiaries controlled by a foreign taxpayer “is in
policy terms a source tax” on income of the controlling foreign
taxpayer.27 This equates the treatment of income earned by a
foreign taxpayer operating through a permanent establishment
with income earned through a subsidiary.
B. The Historical Success of the Positive Function in the United
States
I now turn to the question of whether the positive approach
has any merit in the context of international tax reform in the
United States. The approach made historical sense. Namely,
when the corporate tax-residence test was first formulated, it
was reasonable to assume that the residence of a U.S.
corporation positively pointed to the source of income earned by
the corporation.
24 Richard Vann, “Liable to Tax” and Company Residence Under Tax Treaties, in
RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EC LAW 197, 199 (Gugliemo Maisto
ed., 2009) [hereinafter RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES].
25 OECD, COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL Art. 7 (2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/
oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-oncapital-2010_9789264175181-en.
26 Id. Art. 5.
27 Vann, supra note 24, at 199–200.
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Early U.S. corporate tax laws were justified as an
instrument targeting either managers or shareholders. Such
policy considerations were largely devoid, however, of
international considerations. It was not until the third decade of
the twentieth century that the U.S. worldwide, residence-based
approach to international tax began to take shape.28 However, as
I explain below, late nineteenth to early twentieth century U.S.
corporate taxes functionally operated as a source-based
mechanism, and the residence test adopted back then made
functional sense. That was the case whether the policy aim was
shareholders or managers.
1. Why Did the United States Start to Tax Corporations?
The reasons for which Congress originally enacted corporate
income tax laws are disputed. According to one reasoning, the
first attempt by Congress to adopt a general tax on corporate
profits—in the Tariff Act of 189429—was influenced by real entity
theory of the corporation prevalent at that time.30 Real entity
view of the corporation would theoretically support the taxation
of corporations separately from their shareholders. As a
historical explanation, however, entity theory is largely rejected
by modern scholars,31 with one commentator going as far as to
note that “advances in the theory of corporate personality appear
to have had only a modest influence, if any, on the taxation of the
corporation.”32
Currently, accounts explaining the emergence of corporate
taxation in the United States generally follow one of two main
28 Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1026 n.23 (1997) (referring to 1918–1928 as
the “formative period” of U.S. international taxation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece
Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 317
(“The formative period of the U.S. international tax regime . . . was . . . the period between
the two World Wars.”).
29 The 1894 Act imposed a 2% tax on the net income of all “corporations, companies,
or associations doing business for profits in the United States.” Tariff Act of 1894, ch.
349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. The Act was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
30 See GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT, TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: REPORTERS’ STUDY 36–40 (1999)
(arguing for a connection between the development of real entity theories of corporations
and taxation of corporations as separate entities).
31 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1209 (2004) (explaining the reasons for which
real-entity view of corporate tax is “unpersuasive”); Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as
Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 466 (2001)
[hereinafter Bank, Entity Theory as Myth].
32 Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 31.
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paths. According to one theory, corporate taxes as a real entity
measure were first enacted in 1909, primarily as a regulatory
device.33 The tax reflected negative sentiment in Congress
towards large-scale business entities34 that accumulated
substantial power towards the end of the nineteenth century.
Influential corporate managers were identified as a source of
abuse of power.35 It has therefore been suggested that “the
imposition of the corporate tax will enable the government, the
shareholders and the public to obtain information that will serve
as the basis for restricting such managerial abuses of power.”36
Under this approach, the 1909 Act was an attempt to restrict
managerial power.37
Under a second theory, “corporate income tax was originally
adopted as a substitute or ‘proxy’ for taxing corporate
shareholders directly,”38 and the 1909 Act was simply part of a
continuous attempt to tax shareholders’ wealth accumulated by
doing business in corporate form.39 Congress imposed taxes on
companies in the transportation, banking, and insurance
industries—all industries dominated by the corporate form of
doing business—as early as 1864.40 With the proliferation of
general incorporation laws during the second half of the
nineteenth century, corporations came to dominate most
businesses, making the industry-specific approach inadequate.41
The 1894 Act is seen as the first explicit federal attempt to
systemically get at shareholders’ wealth through the taxation of
corporations.42 After the 1894 Act was struck down by the

33 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted in 1909?, in 2
STUDIES IN THE H ISTORY OF TAX LAW 377 (John Tiley ed., 2007) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah,
Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted]; Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1217–20; Marjorie
E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66
IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
34 Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S.
Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 510
(2010); see also Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 31, at 508–11.
35 Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1220 (citing President Taft’s Message to Congress, 44
CONG. REC. 3344 (1909)).
36 Avi-Yonah,Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted, supra note 33, at 383.
37 Id. at 382–87.
38 Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 31, at 452; see also Steven A. Bank,
Entity Theory as a Myth in the US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, in 2 STUDIES IN THE
HISTORY OF TAX LAW, supra note 33, at 393, 393 [hereinafter Bank, US Corporate Excise
Tax of 1909].
39 Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, supra note 38, at 395.
40 Bank, Entity Theory as a Myth, supra note 31, at 504–05.
41 Id. at 505–08 (describing the dramatic increase in doing business through a
corporate form toward the end of the nineteenth century).
42 Id. at 462 (“The simultaneous income taxation of individuals and corporations was
unprecedented at the federal level . . . .”).
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Supreme Court,43 Congress reverted back to its industry-specific
course of action in the War Revenue Act of 1898,44 which imposed
certain taxes on corporations engaged in the sugar and oil
businesses. In its original version, the 1898 legislative proposals
were broad enough to encompass all incorporated entities.45
Congress ultimately rejected the idea in favor of taxation of two
specific industries, sugar and oil.46 However, “it was commonly
understood that the object of the tax was two concerns—the
Standard Oil Company and the American Sugar Refining
Company.”47 General taxation of all corporate entities was
reintroduced in the 1909 Act, which was evidently tailored so as
to withstand constitutional challenges, again as a mechanism to
get at shareholders’ wealth.48
2. Place of Incorporation Test Functioned to Support
Source-Based Taxation
Assuming any of the historical justifications for U.S.
corporate taxation are plausible, did corporate tax-residence
constructs support such purposes? Tax-residence of corporations
was first explicitly defined in the War Revenue Act of 1917.49
Section 200 of the 1917 Act defined a “domestic” corporation to be
any corporation “created under the law of the United States, or of
any State, Territory, or District thereof.”50 This definition—using
the place of incorporation (POI) as the sole determinant of
corporate tax residency—survives almost unchanged to this
day.51 Curiously, the definition did not appear in the early
version of the bill. Congressional records provide no explanation
for the definition’s sudden appearance in the bill’s conference
version.52
43

(1895).

Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601

War Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448.
See Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, supra note 38, at 396–98 (discussing
the original bill of the 1898 Act).
46 The 1898 Act did not clearly define the corporations that were the subject of the
tax. Rather, it defined the taxpayers subject to the tax by describing the business sectors
in which they were engaged. Section 27 of the 1898 Act imposed the tax on “every person,
firm, corporation, or company carrying on or doing the business of refining petroleum, or
refining sugar.” 30 Stat. at 464.
47 Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, supra note 38, at 399.
48 Id. at 400–01.
49 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 200, 40 Stat. 300, 302.
50 Id.
51 Under current I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), a domestic corporation is any corporation
“created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any
State.” I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2012).
52 The definition of “domestic” did not appear in early versions of the bill. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. NO. 65-45 (1917). The first time the definition appeared in any formal version
44
45
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However, the 1917 Act was merely a semantic change to an
already functioning jurisdictional concept. Specifically, the same
jurisdictional concepts had already been clearly established by
the 1909 Act. Even though the 1909 Act did not explicitly define
the terms “domestic” or “foreign” corporations, taxing jurisdiction
applied, much like the 1917 Act, to
every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for
profit and having a capital stock represented by shares . . . organized
under the laws of the United States or of any State or Territory of the
United States . . . [or] organized under the laws of any foreign country
and engaged in business in any State or Territory of the United
States.53

However, in the case of corporations organized under the laws of
foreign countries, the tax applied to net income “from business
transacted and capital invested within the United States.”54
Once again, the 1909 legislators left very little guidance, and
certainly no explicit explanation, as to their adoption of the POI
test.55 One commentator, Rudolf Weber-Fas, expressed
skepticism that any rationale for adopting the POI test in the
United States existed at all,56 and speculated that—given the
minor role of international trade in U.S. economy at that time—
international tax considerations have not been a source of
“principal legislative concern.”57 Weber-Fas concluded that it is
likely Congress simply adopted the POI test because it was used
by many states at the time.58
Indeed, during the nineteenth century, most states imposed
various levies and property taxes on corporations “domiciled” or
“resident” within the state’s territory.59 Thus, Weber-Fas
implicitly suggests at least one possible explanation for the
adoption of POI at the federal level: path-dependence. But this

was in the draft submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance on May 25, 1917. See
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 65TH CONG., ACT TO PROVIDE WAR REVENUE (1917).
Congressional records do not reveal the background for this sudden appearance.
53 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (emphasis added); see also William
P. McClure & Herman B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909 to 1989: How
a Tilted Playing Field Developed, 43 TAX NOTES 1379, 1381 (1989).
54 § 38, 36 Stat. at 113.
55 Rudolf
Weber-Fas, Corporate Residence Rules for International Tax
Jurisdiction: A Study of American and German Law, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 215
(1968).
56 Id. (“The existence of a clear rationale or of a conscious policy behind the adoption
of [the POI] principle is doubtful . . . .”).
57 Id. at 216–17.
58 Id. at 216.
59 Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 511–17 (describing the adoption of corporate level
taxes by multiple states during the nineteenth century).
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path-dependence argument is significant, because at the state
level, corporate tax-residence determination served as a source
proxy.
Specifically, during much of the nineteenth century, states
enjoyed territorial monopolies on corporate law.60 Incorporation
was not freely available. Rather, corporate charters were granted
by special legislative acts of the states.61 Consistent with such
notion, “it was generally understood that a corporation’s legal
standing reached only to the borders of the incorporating state”
and that “a corporation existed only within the borders of the
sovereign that created it.”62 Consequently, it was accepted that a
corporation, as a separate entity, “[could not] be taxed except by
the State which created it,”63 and that states could tax “foreign”
corporations only on “[t]he privilege of acting” within the taxing
state’s territory.64
This view of the corporation worked well with state-level
corporate taxation during most of the nineteenth century. At the
time, corporations had limited geographical reach. “Businesses
transacted primarily in local product, labor, and capital markets,
and rarely had operations out-of-state.”65 State-level corporate
taxation had even been justified, among other reasons, on
administrative grounds, noting the advantage of the state over
the federal government in taxing locally-operated businesses.66
It is not only the case the state-chartered businesses were
locally operated by nature of their business;67 many state laws
also required it. “Corporations and legislatures expected—and
legislatures sometimes mandated—that corporations would have
significant operations in the incorporating state, that officers and
directors would be residents of that state, and that shareholders’
and directors’ meetings would be held in the state.”68 The

60 Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J.
CORP. L. 33, 46 (2006).
61 Id. at 46–47; Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 515.
62 Tung, supra note 60, at 54.
63 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR ., THE LAW OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 462, at 619 (1904).
64 Id. § 462, at 620.
65 Tung, supra note 60, at 46; see also Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise
of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29 BUS. H IST. REV. 105, 107 (1955)
(noting that until 1880, the U.S. economy was “typified by small single-plant companies
serving limited markets”).
66 Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 516.
67 Tung, supra note 60, at 56 (“[F]irms ordinarily incorporated in the state where
their organizers resided and where their major operations were located.”) (emphasis
added).
68 Id. at 56–57.
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functional result was a convergence of the place of residency of
capital-owners, residency of managers, the place of incorporation,
and the place where the corporation did business.
Under such a set of circumstances, it was perfectly sensible
to view the place of residence of a company as the source of
income earned by the company.69 Consequently, payouts from a
company of a state could have been assumed to be supported by
income earned in that state.
This logic also extended to federal-level corporate taxes.
Under
the
historical
circumstances
surrounding
the
crystallization of federal corporate taxation in the United States,
the corporations that were the intended targets of corporate tax
laws were incorporated in the United States and at the same
time derived most of their income from U.S. sources.
Specifically, during the late nineteenth century, U.S.
businesses were overwhelmingly focused on U.S. local markets,
which provided a “continental size” consumer base for their
products.70 The economic opportunities of scale could all be
exploited with no need to look to foreign markets. American
companies thus tended to invest in their own backyard,71 and the

69 Interestingly, state-level corporate taxes had territorial effects similar to the ones
experienced by civil law countries in mainland Europe. In Continental Europe of the
nineteenth century, foreign companies were generally not recognized, nor allowed, to
operate within a jurisdiction unless a treaty so provided. By the late nineteenth century,
most mainland European jurisdictions had laws under which domestic companies were
legally recognized only if they had their main economic activity within the jurisdiction of
residence. The purpose of these sets of laws was to prevent shareholders from operating
in their own jurisdiction through a foreign company, and by doing so, to avoid the reach of
local corporate law. Similarly, these rules prevented shareholders from operating in a
foreign jurisdiction through a domestic company, thus avoiding the foreign jurisdiction’s
corporate law. The result of these incorporation rules was that companies were only
recognized and allowed to operate in the countries where their real activity took place,
which later became known as the “real seat” or “central administration” principle.
Considering the cost and speed of travel and communications at that time, it followed that
management were placed in the same jurisdiction where operations were conducted. This
“real seat” test has been carried into tax law, as most continental jurisdictions originally
determined the tax-residence of corporations based on the “real seat” test. Many still do.
See John F. Avery Jones, Corporate Residence in Common Law: The Origins and Current
Issues, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 121, 132–33.
70 MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, THE RISE OF MODERN BUSINESS: GREAT BRITAIN, THE
UNITED STATES, GERMANY, JAPAN & CHINA 87 (3d ed., 2008).
71 JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT H ISTORY
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 164 (2003); LANCE E. DAVIS & ROBERT J. CULL,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1820–1914, at
79− 91 (1994) (discussing the insignificance of foreign investment by U.S. investors
between 1797 and 1896).
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United States only played a minor role in global trade. 72 While
U.S. exports steadily increased during the nineteenth century,
the United States remained a net-capital importer until the end
of the century.73 Even amid positive inflow of investment, up
until the early nineteenth century (when the 1909 Act became
functional), foreign investment in the United States did not play
a significant role in U.S. economic growth.74 Thus, it would seem
plausible to argue that jurisdiction to tax corporations could have
acted as a functional equivalent of territorial taxation.
The corporations at issue were for the most part
state-chartered corporations, which meant that their owners and
managers were most probably U.S. residents (by virtue of being
residents in the charter state), and that they operated primarily
within the United States. Control patterns at the time also
supported the localized view of the corporations. “As the 19th
century was drawing to a close, family control of industrial
enterprises was the norm in the United States and there were
only very rare examples of companies with widely dispersed
shareholdings and well-developed managerial hierarchies.”75
Thus, the assumption of identity between POI, residency of
managers, residency of shareholders, and the place of activity
obviously worked for the federal level just as it worked at the
state level.
However, during the second half of the nineteenth century,
an increasing number of states neglected the model of
state-chartered corporations in favor of general incorporation
laws.76 Local business entrepreneurs were quick to take
advantage of the liberalization of corporate laws, and “by 1904
corporations accounted for three-quarters of the United States’
industrial outputs.”77 Between the 1890s and the early 1900s, the
U.S. economy underwent an unprecedented wave of
consolidations, resulting in the separation of management from

72 Robert E. Lipsey, U.S. Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments, 1800-1913, at
5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4710, 1994), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4710.pdf.
73 Id. at 10.
74 DAVIS & CULL, supra note 71, at 111.
75 Brian R. Cheffins, Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as Determinants of
Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave of 1897 to 1903, at 4 (Dec. 15,
2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Chapman Law Review), available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2x90s8bc#page-1.
76 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 135–37 (1932) (describing the erosion of centralized ownership
structure parallel to adoption of general corporate laws in multiple states).
77 BLACKFORD, supra note 70.
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control.78 This period saw the institutionalization of managerial
capitalism, namely the rise of professional, hierarchical salaried
management at the expense of personal management by
owners.79 Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, the
assumption of identity between the place of incorporation, source
of income, and the residency of shareholders or managers seemed
not at all obvious.
Nonetheless, a functional argument for POI had merit even
under the newly developed socio-economic environment of the
early twentieth century. The wave of consolidations engulfing the
United States starting in the 1890s indeed changed the
ownership structures of U.S. corporations. However, it
apparently did not change the national identity of the
corporations’ owners and managers, nor did it change the
geographical source of the corporations’ income. The
consolidation movement was horizontal in nature. It was
characterized by the amalgamation of multiple small and
medium businesses in the same industry into trusts, and later
into holding companies.80 Owners of the “old” family businesses
ceded management rights to some form of central management,
but did not relinquish their ownership.81 The result was the
diffusion of ownership, but the centralization of management.82
Thus, the transformation was from a situation in which many
U.S. individuals owned and managed many U.S. incorporated
corporations, to a situation in which many U.S. individuals
owned or managed few U.S. incorporated corporations that
earned income in the United States. To the extent that the true
targets of corporate taxes were those individuals’ income, POI
still made sense.
Interestingly, the classes of owners and managers targeted
by early corporate taxes never remained in the abstract.
Individuals were, at times, identified by name. For example, in
1889, Thomas G. Shearman published an article titled The
Owners of the United States.83 The article was one of the earliest
78 PAUL FRENTROP, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 1602–2002, at 192–94
(2002); Navin & Sears, supra note 65; Cheffins, supra note 75, at 6–10.
79 Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 524.
80 For a description of the U.S. horizontal consolidation movement at the end of the
nineteenth century see, e.g., FRENTROP, supra note 78, at 192–94; Navin & Sears, supra
note 65; Cheffins, supra note 75, at 12 (“One key constituency which remained when a
turn-of-the-century merger had been concluded was composed of the owners of the
formerly autonomous firms encompassed within the consolidation. This was because of
the merger package typically offered to incumbents with an industry.”).
81 FRENTROP, supra note 78, at 193.
82 Cheffins, supra note 75, at 10–11.
83 Thomas G. Shearman, The Owners of the United States, 8 FORUM 262 (1898).
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attempts to measure income distribution within the United
States. Shearman found that “40,000 persons own[ed] over one
half of the wealth of the United States, while one seventieth part
of the people own[ed] over two thirds of the wealth.”84 Even more
significant was Shearman’s conclusion that while the top echelon
of wealthy Americans greatly benefited from the indirect effects
of taxation, they carried little of the tax burden.85 Shearman’s
article turned out to be highly influential.86
Shearman supported his conclusions not by numbers alone,
but also, for lack of a better description, by “name calling.”
Shearman identified by name many of the wealthiest Americans
avoiding the tax burden, putting faces on the abstract notion of
“rich Americans.” He spelled out names such as Astor,
Vanderbilt, Rockefeller, and many more as specific examples.87
“Name calling” was common in floor debates, both in the context
of the 1894 Act and of the 1909 Act. Wealth distribution played a
major role in these debates, and elected officials frequently
named the intended targets of corporate taxes.88 These wealthy
individuals were understood to be the intended target of the Acts.
Significantly, these identified individuals held most of their
wealth in corporations incorporated in the United States. These
corporations, in turn, earned much (if not all) of their income
from U.S. operations.89 Standard Oil and the American Sugar

Id. at 271.
Id. at 272.
Shearman was invited to testify at the Ways and Means tax subcommittee when
potential changes to tax law had begun to be discussed in 1893. STEVEN S. WEISMAN, THE
GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN TO WILSON–THE FIERCE BATTLES OVER MONEY AND POWER
THAT TRANSFORMED THE NATION 124 (2002).
87 Shearman, supra note 83, at 265.
88 In the context of the 1894 Act, see, e.g., WEISMAN, supra note 86, at 137 (referring
to Benton McMillin, the chairman of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Taxation and
one of the original drafters of the 1894 bill, who argued that empires fell due to wealth
concentration, noting that “the Emperor of Russia, the Sultan of Turkey, the Emperor of
Austria, the Emperor of Germany, the King of Italy, Queen Victoria and others
who . . . were worth less than the Rothschilds, Rockefellers, Vanderbilts and others in the
United States”); see id. at 144 (noting that Senator William Allen of Nebraska, who “[i]n
defending the tax . . . asserted that 9 percent of the families in America owned 71 percent
of the wealth. In New York alone, he declared . . . there were 119 millionaires! He rattled
off their names: Vanderbilt, Whitney, Rockefeller and so on . . . .”). In the context of the
1909 Act, see id. at 219 (quoting Representative Cordell Hull as complaining about the
“‘infamous system of class legislation’ that burdened the average person while ‘virtually
exempting the Carnegies, the Vanderbilts, the Morgans, and the Rockefellers, with their
aggregated billions of hoarded wealth’”).
89 The source of wealth of these corporations has also been part of the political
debate. Corporations were regarded as a “class of our citizens who own and control a very
large and increasing part of the property of the country; who enjoy certain public
franchises of very substantial character.” STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD : THE
84
85
86
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Refinery Company, the intended targets of the 1898 Act,90 were
both perfect examples. Standard Oil was incorporated by John
Davison Rockefeller in 1870 in Ohio.91 The American Sugar
Refining Company, substantially owned and managed by Henry
Osborne Havemeyer, was incorporated in 1891 in New Jersey.92
Other examples of companies owned or managed by individuals
who were identified in tax reform debate included the
Vanderbilts’ railroad empire, which was composed of several
state-chartered corporations incorporated during the nineteenth
century,93 as was the Goulds’ railroad conglomerate.94 The Astors’
fur trading empire was operated, among others, via the American
Fur Company, incorporated in New York in 1808.95
To summarize, from a jurisdictional point of view, it does not
matter if one prefers the regulatory argument or wealth
distribution argument to explain the corporate tax acts of the
late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries in the United
States. The intended targets of the corporate tax acts were
named. These individuals held their fortune by virtue of their
ownership or control of corporations that were incorporated and
operated in the United States. Under such circumstances, the
POI model effectively operated to tax income earned by such
individuals from their U.S.-based operations.
C. The Modern Failure of the Positive Function in the United
States
Thus far I have shown that in the historical context
surrounding the adoption of corporate taxation in the United
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 46–47 (2010) (citing
William L. Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. L. REV. 1).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 44–47.
91 7 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 520–21 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003).
92 See WM. SULZER, AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY 9 (1904), available at
http://ia700409.us.archive.org/27/items/cu31924103062851/cu31924103062851.pdf.
93 For example, Vanderbilt is well known for his involvement within the New York &
Erie Railroad. See EDWARD J. RENEHAN JR., COMMODORE : THE LIFE OF CORNELIUS
VANDERBILT 243 (2007). The New York & Erie Railroad was incorporated under a state
act of New York. See Erie Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 88 U.S. 492, 493 (“The Erie Railroad
Company was chartered by an act of the legislature of the State of New York, April 24th,
1832, with power to construct a railroad from the city of New York to Lake Erie, through
the southern tier of counties of the State of New York.”).
94 For example, in 1860 Jay Gould purchased the controlling interest in the
Rutland & Washington Railroad Company and became its president. See 7 THE NATIONAL
CYCLOPÆDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, JAMES T. WHITE COMPANY 218 (1899). The
Rutland & Washington Railroad Company was chartered under an act of the state of
Vermont in 1847. See 1 THE RAILROAD LAWS AND CHARTERS OF THE UNITED STATES 844
(W.P. Gregg & Benjamin Pond eds., 1851).
95 STATE OF N.Y., AN ACT TO INCORPORATE THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY, ch. CXL
(1835) (passed April 6, 1808).
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States, the POI test for tax-residence determination operated as
a source-based tax instrument. This is a functional rather than a
historical argument. Namely, I do not suggest that the original
drafters of U.S. corporate tax law have purposely so designed the
tax-residence test. This would necessitate full-blown historical
research, well beyond the scope of a symposium piece. However,
the functional argument demonstrates that the adopted
residence test (POI) supported source taxation, and that in turn,
source-based taxation supported the historical purposes for
which the United States adopted corporate taxes.
The consideration of current territorial reform proposals
thus begs two questions: First, will a POI test support source
taxation under current economic conditions? Namely, if a
corporation is incorporated in the United States, does POI
positively point to the United States as the source of income (and
if a corporation is incorporated elsewhere, does this suggest that
the source of income is not the United States)? Second, if the
answer is in the negative, is there any other corporate
tax-residence test that might positively point to the source of
income earned and distributed by a corporation?
It is clear that the answer to the first question is in the
negative. Today, unlike the early twentieth century, the United
States takes a leading role in the global economy.96
U.S.-incorporated corporations can freely operate around the
world and earn foreign-source income. The assumption that such
corporations accumulate all of their wealth from domestic
operations is no longer viable. Conversely, there is ample
evidence that U.S.-incorporated corporations accumulate most of
their profits not directly, but in affiliates incorporated in
low-to-no tax jurisdictions (where no economic activity takes
place).97 It is easy and practically costless to incorporate a
subsidiary in a tax haven, thereby avoiding U.S. taxing
jurisdiction altogether. Meaning, foreign incorporation does not
mean that income is not sourced to the United States. POI is
dysfunctional to the extent we expect it to point to the source of
income.

96 As of December 2013, “[t]he United States is the largest investor abroad and the
largest recipient of direct investment in the world.” JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS21118, U.S. D IRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD: TRENDS AND CURRENT ISSUES (2013).
97 See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40178,
TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(2011); see also STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM . ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL A FFAIRS , 112TH C ONG., REP. ON REPATRIATING
OFFSHORE FUNDS: 2004 TAX WINDFALL FOR SELECT MULTINATIONALS (Comm. Print 2011).
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Answering the second question—whether any tax-residence
test other than POI can positively point to the source of income of
a corporation—is more complex. The United States’s formal POI
test is frequently contrasted with more substantive corporate
tax-residence tests used by other jurisdictions. Substantive tests
inquire into various “connecting factors” that define “the link
between a company and the national territory of the State who
wants to exercise its jurisdiction to tax that company . . . .”98
Such tests may include, among others, the central management
and control (CMC) test;99 the place of effective management
(POEM);100 the place where main economic activity is carried
on;101 or the place of residence of shareholders.102 An argument
can be made that a substantive residence test can theoretically
point to the source of income. The logic is that substantive tests
point to the jurisdiction of the corporation’s real economic
attributes, where income is presumably generated.

98 See Peter Behrens, General Principles of Residence of Companies, in RESIDENCE
COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 3, 26–27; see also Pasquale Pistone, EC Law and Tax
Residence of Companies, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 183, 184–85.
99 The CMC test is used by all commonwealth jurisdictions, and widely adopted
throughout the world. Under this test, “a company resides for purposes of income tax
where its real business is carried on[,] . . . and the real business is carried on where the
central management and control actually abides.” De Beers Consolidated Mines,
Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] 5 A.C. 455 (H.L.) 458. For an excellent discussion on the adoption of
the managed and controlled tests by Commonwealth jurisdictions, see ROBERT COUZIN,
CORPORATE RESIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 22 (2002); see also
AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 435 (noting that Commonwealth jurisdictions
traditionally adhered to the CMC test).
100 This test is adopted by most civil law jurisdictions, and is the test prescribed by
the OECD model, which it defines as “the place where key management and commercial
decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in
substance made.” OECD COMMITTEE ON F ISCAL AFFAIRS , MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 77 (2008). In most cases POEM is one and
the same as CMC. See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, INTM120210–COMPANY
RESIDENCE: GUIDANCE ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE INTERNATIONAL TAX HANDBOOK, at
ITH348 (2010), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm1202
10.htm#IDA1ORZF (explaining the apparent differences between CMC and POEM and
concluding that “it is not that easy to divorce effective management from central
management and control and in the vast majority of cases they will be located in the same
place”). For a description of different factual tests adopted by civil law jurisdictions, see
Luc De Broe, Corporate Tax Residence in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in RESIDENCE OF
COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 95.
101 In Italy, a corporation will be considered “domestic” for tax purposes if, among
satisfaction of other criteria, its main business purpose is in Italy for the greater part of
the financial year. See, e.g., CARLO GALLI, INT’L BUREAU OF F ISCAL DOCUMENTATION,
CORPORATE TAXATION—ITALY 26 (2013).
102 Countries using some variation of the residence-of-shareholders test include, for
example, Australia and Italy. See Michael Dirkis, Australia, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES ,
supra note 24, at 311, 324–29 (discussing the ownership-presumption model adopted in
Australia); see also Mario Tenore, Italy, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES, supra note 24, at
519, 540–44 (discussing the ownership-presumption model adopted by Italy).

OF
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Unfortunately, due to the nature of income and operations of
multinational corporations, this argument is unconvincing. A
single corporation can operate in multiple jurisdictions. Multiple
different activities (such as research, manufacturing,
advisement, sales, and so on) can each take place in a different
jurisdiction (or each in multiple jurisdictions), notwithstanding
all are aimed at generating the same stream of income. Under
such circumstances, few streams of income can be said to have
identifiable sources, and therefore no residence test can be said
to point to the source of the income of a corporation. The
production of income is no longer bound by physical proximities
that converge around a single factor (or even around multiple
factors with clear locational attributes). In short, “[t]here is no
unifying normative concept that justifies treating income as
derived in one jurisdiction rather than another.”103
This does not mean that corporate tax-residence has no
function in supporting source-based taxation. To the contrary,
tax-residence still plays a major part in sourcing income, but we
must rethink the instrumentality of residence determination in
such context. I address this issue in the next Part.
III. THE “NEGATIVE” FUNCTION OF CORPORATE TAX-RESIDENCE
A. Corporate Tax-Residence and Income Shifting
In order to understand what might be the territorial
instrumentality of corporate tax-residence determination, we
must make a preliminary assumption, that income indeed has a
source, or sources (notwithstanding we may have difficulty
identifying such sources). Once this threshold is cleared, we must
question what role (if any) corporate tax-residence could play in
supporting source taxation in an environment where the positive
identification of sources is almost impossible.
The positive difficulty with source-based taxation
materializes in the problem of income shifting. Income shifting is
a generic name for any technique by which a multinational group
is able to have income that is economically generated in one
jurisdiction, reported for tax purposes in another jurisdiction. For
example, a patent could be completely developed in the labs of a
corporation residing in a tax jurisdiction. It is very easy,
103 Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, supra note 3, at 1631; Edward D.
Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 143 (2011) (“[T]he global
tax norms that define the geographic source of income or expense are largely artificial
constructs, difficult to administer and often devoid of any conceptual foundation.”)
[hereinafter Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income].
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however, to have the patent legally owned by an affiliate that
resides in a tax haven. Thus, all royalties are paid to the tax
haven corporation where income is booked, notwithstanding that
all research activity took place in the parent’s jurisdiction, and
that the affiliate did not meaningfully participate in the activity.
Professor Edward Kleinbard famously coined the phrase
“stateless income” to describe the resulting tax consequences. He
defines stateless income as “the movement of taxable income
within a multinational group from high-tax to low-tax source
countries without shifting the location of externally-supplied
capital or activities involving third parties.”104
Income shifting techniques have received much attention in
recent tax reform discourse in the United States105 and are the
focus of a major project undertaken by the OECD.106 To date,
most mechanisms that have been put in place to address income
shifting have, in one way or another, focused on making sure that
income that is being “shifted” is “resourced” to its “true” origin.107
For example, intercompany pricing measures focus on making
sure that intercompany dealings are priced at arm’s-length, so
profits are not booked with foreign affiliates in tax havens.
“Anti-stripping” mechanisms are intended to assure that income
is not “stripped” from the source jurisdiction through deductible
payments to a foreign affiliate. Controlled Foreign Corporation
(CFC) regimes make income that is nominally earned by foreign
affiliates taxed to the parent unless the foreign affiliate is
substantively engaged in an active trade or business in the
foreign jurisdiction.
Importantly for our purposes, any income shifting technique
depends on the existence of both “domestic” and “foreign” affiliate
corporations. Corporate tax-residence is thus an integral part to
any income shifting technique, and as such can be a significant
instrument in preventing it.

Kleinbard, supra note 1, at 702.
See Omri Marian, Meaningful Corporate Tax Residence, 140 TAX NOTES 470,
470 −71 (2013).
106 For a discussion on the BEPS OECD project, see Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?,
FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2408034.
107 Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, supra note 103, at 140–51 (discussing
common anti-income-shifting mechanisms).
104
105
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B. The Negative Function Explained: Formalism as a Proxy for
Non-Source
While corporate tax-residence cannot positively point to the
source of income, it can identify the jurisdictions in which income
is definitely not generated. Since income shifting heavily depends
on corporate tax-residence determination, the idea would be to
design the residence test in a manner that would not allow
income to be reported in a jurisdiction where a corporation has no
real economic attributes. I refer to this approach as the “negative
function” of corporate tax-residence.
A stylized example will help to demonstrate this “negative
function.” Assume a world of three jurisdictions: Fredonia,
Sylvania, and Florin. Both Fredonia and Sylvania are developed,
high-tax jurisdictions. Florin is a tax haven. The GCH Group is a
global leader in the designing and manufacturing of widgets.
GCH’s headquarters as well as its research facilities are found in
Fredonia, and are operating through a publically traded
corporation, FredoniaCo. Each widget designed by FredoniaCo is
IP protected, but the IP is owned by a GCH subsidiary resident
in Florin, FlorinCo. FlorinCo has no employees. Two other GCH
subsidiaries, FreCo and SylCo are residents in Fredonia and
Sylvania, respectively. They both pay FlorinCo royalties for the
right to manufacture the IP-protected widgets in their respective
jurisdictions. FreCo and SylCo then sell the widgets in Fredonia
and Sylvania, respectively, at a substantial markup over the cost
of production. The deductible royalty to FlorinCo is set to match
the gain from selling the widgets. In such a manner, all income is
booked to FlorinCo (i.e., the royalties income), in spite of the fact
that there is no economic activity in Florin. No income is booked
to either Sylvania or Fredonia—due to the deductible royalties—
in spite of the fact that both Sylvania and Fredonia are
jurisdictions where real economic activity takes place.
Assume that at some point FlorinCo makes payments (for
example, in the form of dividends) to Sylvania or Fredonia. If
Fredonia and Sylvania are both territorial jurisdictions, such
payments will not result in income recognition in those
jurisdictions, since the payments will be foreign-sourced. That is
the case because payments of dividends and interest are
generally sourced to the residence of the payor, which in this case
is Florin.
Traditional anti-shifting mechanism will focus the efforts on
resourcing the income from Florin to Sylvania or Fredonia (for
example, by adjusting the dollar value of the royalties, thereby
reducing deductions to FreCo and SylCo). My suggestion would
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be to support these mechanisms by a residency construct that
assures that FlorinCo is not considered a resident in Florin,
where it has no economic attributes. Under such circumstances,
no income will be sourced to Florin (since FlorinCo will be
resident in a place other than Florin), and income shifting is
prevented.
Importantly, the function of such residence determination is
strictly negative. It does not positively point to the source of
income as being in Fredonia or Sylvania, even though these are
the only two available alternatives if Florin is ruled out. But
where the “real residence” is, is irrelevant in this context.
Negative
residency
construction
simply
prevents
“false-residency.” Income will thus be sourced to a jurisdiction
where some economic attributes exist (regardless if income was
indeed produced in that jurisdiction), and not where income could
not have possibly been produced.
Obviously, the negative function of corporate tax-residence
demands that tax-residence be determined based on substantive
connecting factors of the corporation to a jurisdiction. A formal
residency determination such as POI would make it very easy (as
is the case today under U.S. law) to incorporate pocketbook
entities in tax havens, and book income to such entities. In a
sense, “formal” residency attributes serve as a proxy to
“non-source.”
C. The Negative Function in Practice: Formulary
Apportionment as a Tax-Residence Test
The last part of the functional puzzle is to determine how to
construct a substantive corporate tax-residence test that can
properly function to prevent income shifting.
It has previously been argued that corporate tax-residence is
largely elective, in the sense that the taxpayer can arrange their
affairs in a way that corporations reside for tax purposes in a
jurisdiction of their choosing.108 As a factual matter such
argument is probably correct, and presents challenges to the
functional project. However, arranging residence in one
jurisdiction rather than another is not costless. Residence
electivity is a matter of degree.109 This largely solves the problem
for our purposes. The sole requirement of a “negative”
tax-residence construction in a territorial system is that it

108
109

Shaviro, supra note 12, at 381–85.
Id. at 384.
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decreases the electivity of tax-residence of a corporation to an
extent that a corporation could not be resident where it has no
(or very little) economic attributes. There is no need to identify
“real” residency. In other words, the idea would be to increase the
costs of residence election.
Increasing the cost of residence electivity means that
tax-residence of corporations should not be determined by a
single “substantive” factor (for example, the place of
management). A single factor test will be rather easy to
manipulate. For example, many jurisdictions use the place of
central management and control (CMC) as the tax-residence test
for corporations. It used to be the case that the place of CMC was
presumed to be the place where board meetings are held.110 This
test is easy to manipulate by having the board meetings
conducted in a tax haven. Effectively, it makes the CMC test a
formal one. In other words, single factor tests may be too elective.
Obviously, an alternative would be to use multiplicity of
factors, such as CMC, the place where the economic activity
takes place, and so on. The problem with such an approach is
that it is difficult to administer. In today’s world, a corporation
may have its management, assets, and operations spread across
the globe. Deciding a single location for residence under such
circumstances is administratively challenging (which factors
should take precedent?) and largely meaningless.
Nonetheless, our aim is not to “discover” the “true” residency
of a corporation. It would therefore be satisfactory to combine the
“multiplicity of factors” approach with an administratively
feasible approach that is less than accurate. Luckily, such an
approach has already been suggested and heavily discussed in
other contexts: the formulary apportionment approach.

110 In the past, where the board met was seen as the decisive factor for purposes of
making a determination as to the place of management, as expressed in the previous
version of the OECD tax-treaty model. See OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 81 (2005) (“The place of effective management
will ordinarily be the place where the most senior person or group of persons (for example
a board of directors) makes its decisions, the place where the actions to be taken by the
entity as a whole are determined.”). However, in July of 2008, the OECD neglected the
“place of board meeting” presumption, and adopted a much more nuanced (and less clear)
test to determine the place of management: the decision is based on “facts and
circumstances.” See OECD COMM . ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 77 (2008) (“All relevant facts and circumstances must be
examined to determine the place of effective management.”).
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Formulary apportionment has been proposed as an
alternative to the territorial versus global taxation debate.111
Specifically, formulary apportionment is a method used to
allocate taxing jurisdiction from multijurisdictional activity by
taking into account the relative weights (therefore “formulary”)
of various economic attributes such as payroll, assets, and sales
in various jurisdictions. “Under a formulary profit split, tax
liabilities would reflect the economic reality of globally integrated
businesses, and they would not vary among businesses based on
their relative abilities to shift the ownership of intangible
property.”112
The formulary apportionment approach is by no means
uncontested.113 Many doubt that such an approach can be applied
as a unilateral measure, question which economic “attributes”
should be taken into account in the formula, and doubt the extent
to which such attributes are immune to taxpayers’ manipulation.
But for our purpose, it does not really matter. We do not seek a
“correct” result. All we need it to determine is that a corporation
is not resident somewhere.
If a formula that takes into account number of employees,
tangible assets, and sales figures is used to determine the
residency of a corporation, a corporation will have very little
chance to end up a resident in a jurisdiction where it has no
economic activity. Of course, in order to make sense, the formula
must not be calculated on a per-corporation basis. In such a case,
a single employee in a small office may constitute all of the
economic attributes of a corporation incorporated in a tax haven,
which would defeat the purposes of the test. Rather, the
measurement must be proportional to the entire control group.
For example, a corporation would not be able to claim residency
in a jurisdiction unless it meets certain formulary thresholds in
that jurisdiction, compared to the group’s aggregate attributes.
It is likely that a corporation will end up a resident in a
jurisdiction where it has some real infrastructure, which in turn
implies that the jurisdiction is not a tax haven. As such, there is

111 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating
Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA.
TAX REV. 498 (2009).
112 Id. at 507.
113 For more skeptical views of formulary apportionment see, e.g., Julie Roin, Can the
Income Tax be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary
Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169 (2008), and see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J.
Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the U.S. International Income
Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 M ICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014).
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no “foreign corporation” resident in a tax haven, to which income
can be shifted.
CONCLUSION
Corporate tax-residence plays an important role in territorial
tax systems. Poorly constructed corporate tax-residence tests
may be detrimental to source taxation. Conversely, properly
constructed corporate tax-residence models can support source
taxation by preventing income shifting. In turn, this purpose can
be achieved by increasing the cost of electing tax-residence that
is detached from real economic considerations. I have suggested
one way to do so—formulary apportionment—but other
cost-increasing mechanisms may achieve similar results. Of
course, the nuts and bolts of each residence reform will have to
be worked out, a task well beyond the scope of a symposium
piece.
Increasing the cost of residence electivity may draw critique,
as it may make the U.S. tax system less competitive. To the
extent one truly believes in territorial taxation, such critique
cannot stand. If an instrument is designed to support taxation of
income in its true source, it makes little sense to argue against it.
It makes little sense to support source taxation as an ideological
matter and at the same time advocate competitiveness by
allowing taxpayers to strip income away from the jurisdiction of
source. Competitiveness must be addressed by other means, such
as reducing corporate tax rates.
Recent international tax reform proposals in the United
States seem to embrace the idea of territorial taxation.
Unfortunately, such proposals, in their focus on source taxation,
largely lose sight of the relevance of tax-residence determination
to territorial taxation. Residence determination plays an
important role in sourcing income, and is the linchpin for
income-shifting mechanisms that operate against source-based
taxation. This conclusion is particularly important to the United
States, where the cost of tax-residence electivity is practically
zero. It is therefore prudent, if not necessary, that any territorial
reform proposal in the United States considers the tax-residence
of corporations.
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